Structural Analysis of Xenophobia

Abstract

We estimate a signaling game of xenophobic behaviors to understand how individual racial animus and perceived unacceptance of racial animus determine xenophobic behaviors in equilibrium. To identify our model, we design a survey about anti-Chinese xenophobia in the US during the Pandemic. We validate our estimates by comparing our model predictions with the causal estimates obtained from the information Randomized Controlled Trial. We find raising perceived unacceptance is more effective than reducing racial animus at decreasing most xenophobic behaviors. We quantify the effects of a COVID infection and Fox News viewership on xenophobic behaviors in the short and long run.

Huan Deng
Huan Deng
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics

Huan Deng is a doctoral candidate in economics at Johns Hopkins University. Huan Deng has research interests in Labor Economics, Applied Microeconometrics, and Political Economy